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Abstract 
The managerial relationship process between alliance partners is critical for alliance success 
and yet is not always well understood. Drawing upon social exchange theory, we employ 
evidence from the UK construction industry and examine such an exchange process and 
identify important contextual factors that contribute to alliance success. Using data from 204 
building contractor–architect alliances, we: 1) conceptualize affective and cognitive factors—
relational capital and technical exchange, respectively—within the managerial relationship 
process; 2) map antecedent conditions for this process, namely, compatibility and similarity; 
3) examine the moderating effect of firm size on the function of compatibility as an 
antecedent; and 4) identify managerial tenure as a moderator of alliance performance 
outcomes of the process. The results reveal that relational capital between the alliance 
partners is conducive to superior technical exchanges. We show that compatibility, but not 
similarity, is positively linked to relational capital. Further, the association of compatibility 
with relationship capital is more evident among smaller firms. The performance relevance of 
technical exchange is elevated in situations where the alliance partners exhibit longer 
managerial tenure. The study concludes with theoretical implications and recommendations 
for further research. The practical implications for managers are also examined and generate 
insights into the importance of compatible managerial approaches, as determined by firm size, 
and the relative importance of length of tenure in influencing the efficacy of technical 
exchanges in these alliances.  
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Introduction 
Recent decades of empirical research on strategic alliances has provided many and varied 
insights into factors that drive their success. The performance relevance of governance 
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approaches (Gulati and Nickerson 2008; Heide et al 2013; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006), 
behavioral complexities of relationships (Paparoidamis et al 2017; Robson et al 2008), and 
partner characteristics and reciprocities (Eggert et al. 2006; Goerzen, 2007), is well 
documented. The comprehensive attention to antecedent drivers is mirrored by the under 
attended area of the relationship process. This pivotal frontier occurs where alliance factors 
coalesce and provide a platform for managerial relationships to function. Relationships 
between managers do not exist as one-off interactions but as a series of interactions forming 
the interface between organizations. Collectively, the interactions shape norms and rules of 
exchange that represent the managerial tone of the interorganizational agenda (Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005). Such a managerial relationship process is less than well-articulated in the 
literature. The current study seeks to address this by looking deeper into the ‘black box of 
exchange, and unpacking, this relationship process in alliances (Linden et al 1997). 
A bifurcated approach to alliance research is evidenced in the literature by an emphasis on 
interfirm rivalry on the one hand, and collaborative exchange on the other (Park and Ungson, 
2001; Robson et al., 2008). The downside posed by alliance rivalries is increasingly well 
documented in previous studies (Musarra et al., 2016). Yet, the inexorable shift toward 
service dominant economies drives collaborative exchange agendas in practice (Marcos-
Cuevas et al 2016) amplifying the importance of the managerial exchange process and 
highlighting the empirical gap in the literature. The organizational context is ever more 
dynamic with technology bringing expanding possibilities and innovation (Palmatier et al, 
2013), which in turn rely on effective relational exchange among managers. Meanwhile, time-
to-market has become shorter in duration, adding momentum to the collaborative exchange 
movement. Contemporary organizational behavior may be said to be less about locking out 
competitors to secure advantage and more about inviting them in to gain (conditional) access 
to intellectual resources that would be slow to develop in-house (Cadaeux and Ng, 2012). 
Make or buy is often replaced with make and buy as organizations reach into the pool of 
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strategic resources shared among collaborating partner firms in order to bring products and 
services to market more quickly. Such intense dynamism leaves the practitioner balancing 
complex agendas and more dependent on goodwill and associated relational constituents. 
The resulting managerial relationship process is one characterized by a continuous series 
of related and reciprocal exchanges rather than discrete transactions (Marcos-Cuevas et al 
2016; Nonaka, 1994). Common among conventional innovative organizational arrangements, 
this process is presented in sharp relief in project-based collaborative alliances (Toon et al 
2012). The present study adopts this latter context and examines project-based alliances 
between architects and building contractors in the UK construction industry. These 
relationships provide a backdrop of complementarity and dependence and while the industry 
draws intuitive assumptions of a manufacturing profile, the collaborative generation of 
solutions within the managerial relationship process has far more in common with service-
dominant rather than goods-centered logic. Other assumptions attached to this industrial 
context include a reputation for litigation and interfirm rivalry. In practice however, the 
complexity of the projects and the mutual dependence on separate skill sets renders alliances 
necessarily collaborative. Complexity in the projects limits the efficacy of contingent claims 
contracts, because eventualities are not known in advance. Consequently, not all pertinent 
clauses are written into the contract. Instead, trust-based collaborative arrangements address 
this shortcoming by engendering a joint problem-solving atmosphere in which alliance 
partners’ managers “actively engage in a broader scope of the work flow” bringing innovation 
and efficiency (Robson et al., 2008, p.650).  
Our conceptualization of the managerial relationship process is a novel articulation of the 
practical exchange process among counterparts. We challenge traditional assumptions of this 
as a discrete transaction, or series of discrete transactions based on reciprocity alone, and posit 
instead that this process functions as an interactive series of exchanges generating synergistic 
outcomes.  
 5 
Not all firms are able to work together even where the intent exists, and the suitability of 
partner firms is an important antecedent for successful outcomes. We test a dual-construct 
antecedent profile for the managerial relationship process. The level of complementarity of 
the partner firms is informed by shared goals and compatible capabilities on the one hand 
(Sarkar et al., 2001), and by the similarity in their capabilities on the other (Murray and 
Kotabe, 2005). These antecedent managerial conditions of compatibility and similarity are 
redolent of the extant work on coopetition (Bengtsson and Kock 2000), and while larger firms 
may in fact be working simultaneously on other, competing projects, the emphasis here is on 
cooperation rather than competition. 
Typically, smaller firms have fewer capabilities and require more interdependencies 
(Lowik et al 2012). Solving problems under these conditions requires greater cooperation in 
order to access additional or supporting capabilities. Such behaviors are familiar territory for 
smaller firms, whereas larger firms are more inclined toward, and able to achieve, self-
sufficiency. Consequently, we anticipate greater functioning of managerial exchange for small 
(not large) firms. Similarly, since this process is measured at the level of the individual rather 
than the firm (Huang et al 2016), we consider that the qualities of the manager will influence 
the alliance outcome. More experienced managers are expected to carry a greater stock of 
accumulated knowledge of, and skills in, making adaptations (or not) over time. We anticipate 
that managerial tenure will dampen outcomes in collaborative alliances. 
Collectively these conditions in which the managerial exchange process is housed form the 
backdrop for the exchange process and may be considered as contextual drivers for the 
successful process of exchange. While social exchange theory is often employed as an 
explanation of the rules of reciprocity on the one hand and of negotiated rules of transaction 
on the other, little work has been done to address “the possibility that multiple rules are 
employed simultaneously” (Liden et al 2005). We seek to open this black box and give a 
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clearer account of the managerial exchange process, the multiplicity of exchange rules and the 
contextual drivers within which this process functions. 
Understanding of contextual drivers of alliance performance abound in the literature 
(Krishnan et al 2016; Lee et al 2017), while the exchange process is typically dealt with in the 
abstract. In this study, we address this gap in the literature by mapping the contextual 
conditions for exchange and articulating the exchange process within this. Drawing on social 
exchange theory, we 1) conceptualize the managerial relationship process; 2) map antecedent 
conditions for this process; 3) examine the moderating effect of firm size on the function of 
compatibility as an antecedent condition; and 4) identify managerial tenure as a moderator of 
alliance performance outcomes of the process.  
The paper outlines the theoretical framework and hypotheses in the next section. The 
methodology section follows and details the structural equation approach used to test 
hypothesized paths between latent constructs in this investigation. Results from the analysis 
are reported, interpreted and discussed. Finally, study limitations and recommendations for 
practitioners and researchers are outlined in detail. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
The nature of business-to-business relationships is evolving rapidly and presents 
academics and practitioners with challenges in identifying the most effective arrangement of 
these relationships. Central to these challenges is the development of new accounts of 
collaborative interaction. The evolution in practice is routinely attributed to generic drivers 
including globalization and developments in information technology (Palmatier et al, 2013). 
These drivers have been cited for some years and yet they remain central and are helpful in 
conveying a sense of dynamism and an atmosphere of significant change. Such change 
requires rapidity in organizational adaptation and innovation, something typically associated 
with light structures and collaborative atmospheres.  
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Collaborative interaction is not captured well by traditional explanatory perspectives, such 
as transaction costs analysis (TCA). TCA relies on ex ante governance mechanisms in the 
form of contingent claims contracts to address negative behaviors. Limitedly rational decision 
makers (Williamson, 1975) lack advance detail of the terms of many alliance arrangements, 
making contingent claims contracts a limited tool for the governance of all but the most 
general aspects of the relationship (Hammervol, 2009). Contingent claims contracts are 
summative mechanisms and lack efficacy in the governance of real-time collaborative 
behaviors that constantly change in response to innovation and the reformulation of 
expectations. The TCA focus on moderating negative conduct provides a good safety net in 
the event that things go wrong, but such cynicism in interorganizational relationships can also 
damage trust in the working relationship (Lui and Ngo, 2004). Finally, insufficient effort has 
been made in extant empirical work to address the paradox of the diminishing function of 
contracts under uncertainty. Used as a safety net to guard against malfeasance, the contract is 
less able to provide for opportunist behaviors as uncertainty increases since fewer of these can 
be known ex ante (Cadaeux and Ng, 2012). This represents a key limitation of TCA and fresh 
approaches are needed to account more fully for effective relationship arrangements.  
Collaborative alliances under dynamic conditions require agility in decision making. In 
this context, the contingent claims contract typically forms a backdrop for the relationship and 
sets out useful parameters, complementing the function of relational governance from a 
distance (Arranz and Arroyabe, 2012). As the collaboration gains traction it moves beyond 
this and adopts relational, norm-based governance. Intensity is an important aspect in both 
open-ended and fixed-duration relationships (Ness and Haugland, 2005) as it facilitates good 
access to resources (Uzzi, 1997). Further, the potential negative signalling effects of the use 
of a contract may be offset where close relational interaction is the norm (Lui and Ngo, 2004). 
Intense collaborative relationships allow counterparts to effectively reach into one another’s 
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stock of complementary resources, which enables quick decision making on development and 
implementation questions. 
While a lower level of explicit ex ante terms to the relationship may initially increase role 
uncertainty, this can be viewed as leaving space for creative engagement rather than 
functioning as a risk factor presaging partner opportunism (Crespin-Mazet and Ghauri, 2007). 
Collaborative alliances establish themselves with fewer discrete outcome objectives and may 
instead employ metrics that are measurable along the way as part of the collaborative process. 
This is typically the case in a service context. Such measures of success are distinct from 
summative outcome measures since they are available in real time and are used to inform and 
adapt on-going behavior (Gronroos, 2011). Measures include soft factors such as information, 
adaptation of activities (Sobrero and Schrader, 1998), or the solving of a problem in co-
development scenarios (Crespin-Mazet and Ghauri, 2007). Subsets of operational objectives 
are developed, implemented, and changed throughout the collaborative process. As a result, 
discrete outcome measures, where they exist, are a crude proxy for the assessment of these 
relationships. Reciprocal exchange of these factors by partner firms will reinforce relational 
norms thus advancing a collaborative agenda (Wincent, et al 2010).   
The managerial relationship process is somewhat akin to a quality assurance tool such as 
total quality management. Expectations are established, delivered against, redefined and then 
delivered against the redefined criteria. Poor performance is not passed along the value chain 
but is instead addressed and corrected through adaptation. When running smoothly the 
managerial relationship process described here will deliver satisfactory performance 
outcomes since behaviors that are effectively out of specification are corrected in line with 
expectations. There is an element of tautology in this account, with outcomes redefined to 
align with activities. This occurs because we assume a social exchange arrangement heavily 
reliant on social norms within the relationship. These are subjective in nature and emergent in 
form. As a result an appropriate measure of success is performance satisfaction, which can be 
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modelled to include both satisfaction and some objective criteria such as completion time or 
profitability. 
In attaining performance satisfaction, the managerial relationship process must present 
both integrity in conduct and value in outcomes. Integrity is derived from adherence to the 
normative behaviors common among counterparts. For successful exchange to occur, 
counterparts must be willing to give within the relationship with expectations of, but no 
guarantee of, reciprocation. Duration of the periods passing between reciprocal actions are 
important, as are the relative value of these actions. Failure to deliver a timely response of a 
comparable magnitude may damage goodwill and reduce stocks of relational capital. Value of 
outcomes is a product of the synergistic combination of complementary resources. Such 
valuable outcomes will be represented by innovative solutions to problems and measures as 
performance satisfaction. Our conceptual model (Fig. 1.) captures the flow of antecedent 
factors, the managerial relationship process and the predicted outcome articulated above. 
 
- Figure 1. about here – 
 
 
 
Compatibility, relational capital, and firm size 
We define compatibility as the congruence of organizational cultures and technical 
competencies among partner firms.  Where such congruence occurs, it foreshadows relational 
and technical interactions. This blend of factors, from values and norms to goals and 
provision of project-specific resources represents a can-do atmosphere in which the starting 
point is an expectation that project goals will be addressed (Bercovitz et al 2006). It follows 
that without compatibility the project will quickly grind to a halt with attention and resources 
diverted to fixing the gaps in ability of the partner firms to work together before any project 
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tasks can be achieved. Compatibility is a basic requirement of ordinary interorganizational 
relationships and, as such, we argue is an antecedent condition for the managerial relationship 
process.  
Compatibility receives attention across a broad literature including cultural compatibility 
in international studies, and resource and status similarity in strategy (Zhiang et al., 2009). As 
a general concept, it is at times used interchangeably with complementarity and similarity. 
While there is the potential for some conceptual overlap, this can be addressed by clear 
reference to the context. In the present study, we confine attention to the compatibility of the 
managerial and technical approaches of the partner firms. Part of the identification of these 
ontological parameters includes the clarification of what compatibility is not. Similarity is a 
construct in this area serving such a purpose. While a sense of we-ness among partner firms 
may increase the propensity to collaborate (Beugelsdjijk et al., 2009), it does not address the 
can in our conceptualization of compatibility. Willingness is distinct from ability. Shared 
attitudinal goals and philosophies (Wong et al., 2005) are important to the can in 
compatibility along with the clear alignment of resources including compatible technical 
competencies and knowledge (Corsaro and Snehota, 2011).  
We define relational capital here as the expectation of positive behavioral norms among 
partner firms based on closeness, mutual respect, and friendship (Bradach and Eccles 1989; 
Kale et al 2000). Fundamentally, where managerial philosophies and technical capabilities in 
partner firms complement one another, this leaves the way clear for interpersonal 
development and cohesion that drives relational capital. The absence of uncertainty in 
expectations of conduct extends the congruence to that of the counterparts within the firms.  
H1a:  Compatibility between the alliance partners is positively related to relational capital. 
 
Within the present study we use financial turnover as a proxy indicator of firm size. Small 
firms, typically, are more flexible and less systems-led. Additionally, small (versus large) 
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firms are likely to have issues with their level of self-sufficiency and make greater efforts to 
maintain each of their alliances. The resulting effort can manifest in a willingness to adapt to 
the partner’s working practices and so build on pre-existing compatibility to a greater extent 
than would be the case for the larger firm. While small firms may have a number of gaps in 
their skill sets, revealing associated areas of low compatibility (Crespin-Mazet and Ghauri, 
2007), we consider that their propensity to adapt overrides these potential shortcomings.  
We further consider that larger firms with a more systems-driven approach to their 
working practices—for example, with a preference for framework agreements (Simoes and 
Mason, 2012)—may demonstrate high initial compatibility but lower development 
compatibility; thus stunting the development of relational capital. As such, we observe 
characteristic differences between large and small firms. 
Smaller firms typically feature fewer qualified professionals and so field fewer potential 
counterparts to the alliance. The result is a funneling of exchange not just at the individual 
level, but through fewer such individuals. Additional expertise such as quantity surveyors are 
less common among smaller firms providing additional need for smaller firms to collaborate 
more widely to attain the necessary skills resources. Larger firms on the other hand do not 
exhibit such a dichotomy in characteristics. 
Larger firms invest resources across a greater number of relationships and develop 
standardized systems of management. Such standardized approaches can have the effect of 
reducing the need for contact between counterparts at the level that might be expected in the 
absence of a framework agreement. The (unintended) outcome of this system of work is to 
reduce the frequency, and in some cases depth, of interaction among counterparts reducing 
the sense of normative understanding that is often felt in cohesive alliance relationships 
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2009). Compatibility in smaller firms is established through greater 
adaptation, a process in which greater frequency and depth of involvement between 
counterparts becomes necessary. 
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H1b:  Firm size has a negative moderating impact on the link between compatibility and 
relational capital, such that the positive relationship weakens as size increases. 
 
Similarity and relational capital 
We define similarity as the comparability of resource profiles among partner firms. 
Similarity of the resource profile and status of two partner firms reduces the dominance of 
either one of them, and is therefore a prerequisite for relational conduct. Evenness in the 
potential contributions of partner firms serves to ensure a positive, future pattern of 
reciprocity that supports continued activity in the project. While contractual obligations 
would have some say in roles taken by the firms, dissimilarity in their resource profiles 
increases the prospect of malfeasance in contractual obligations on the part of the larger firm. 
The relatively low impact of any penalties resulting from breach of contract, combined with 
the limited ability of the smaller partner firm to pursue these (owing to both lower resources 
and a higher need for continuity of the association), may encourage opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the larger firm. The atmosphere among partners with dissimilar resource profiles 
will contain an inherent understanding of the threat and may impact on negotiations 
throughout the project. Such conditions of duress, felt by the less well-endowed firm, are also 
likely to reduce the prospects of trust-based relationalism. The effect of resource dissimilarity 
among partner firms may need to pass a threshold in the magnitude of the resource 
dissimilarity before such negative impacts can be observed. We thus reason that: 
H2:  Similarity between the alliance partners is positively related to relational capital. 
 
Relational capital and technical exchange 
Relational capital comprises expected norms of behavior among counterparts in partner 
firms. Different levels of these behavioral norms are discernible with societal norms 
providing a normative baseline. Our notion of relational capital, also referred to as social 
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capital in the literature, is a concept that is used to represent factors including tie strength, 
trust, and values; in short almost anything relating to ties between people (Nooteboom, 2007). 
Within the service context, relational capital is based on a narrow suite of factors including 
competence trust (established by reputation), values (assuming broad cultural homogeneity), 
and assumptions relating to standard industry conduct that others build over time (Palmatier et 
al, 2007). Classification of social capital varies in the wider literature to include structural 
social capital, relational social capital and cognitive social capital (Lee, 2009). Here, we 
narrow the focus further to relational social capital, which we term relational capital. 
At the outset of an exchange relation, relational capital may pre-exist at lower levels and is 
evidenced by reputation (competence trust), affiliation to industrial bodies or associations 
(industry standards), and cultural homogeneity (shared values). Importantly, relational capital 
increases where experiences accumulate on the basis of interactions among counterparts. In 
particular, tie strength could be expected to build in response to successful interactions 
between partners. Social capital represents an embedded resource within the alliance (Lin, 
2000), and closer integration between partner firms (Cooke, 2007).  
Relational capital does not exist in the organization but is a facet of the individual, and 
resides in a single business relationship (Kohtamaki et al., 2012) comprising mutual trust, 
respect, and friendship (Kale et al., 2000). Because individuals do not exist in isolation and 
have prior social experiences, they bring with them an expectation of their counterpart’s 
behavior (Blois and Ivens, 2006). All other things being equal, and in the absence of contrary 
information, these expectations will be positive and reflect the characteristics above. 
We define technical exchange as the exchange of technical information necessary to 
conduct the exchange process and facilitate the transfer of technical capabilities. Relational 
capital provides individuals with a predisposition to cooperate; it facilitates the exchange of 
technical information (Lee, 2009). Inherent in this is an assumption that the counterpart is 
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capable of, and willing to, make return technical knowledge transfers (Lee and Cavusgil, 
2006) in a process approaching mutual benevolence (Lee et al., 2008). We reason that: 
H3:  Relational capital between alliance partners is positively related to technical exchange. 
 
Technical exchange, alliance performance satisfaction, and managerial tenure 
Exchange takes place throughout the duration of the relationship and is characterized by a 
multitude of individual exchange episodes. We note that technical exchange includes higher-
level information, facilitating the use or transfer of technical capabilities either as individual 
exchange episodes or cumulatively (Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003).  
For exchange to generate satisfaction it must incorporate appropriate normative conduct. 
Value does not reside exclusively in the information to be exchanged but is also in the process 
of exchange, which includes joint problem-solving and even knowledge co-creation. Episodes 
of exchange are not simultaneous and rely on expectations of reciprocal conduct. These 
unspecified obligations are understood by partner firms and represent a lubricant in the 
exchange process (Blau, 1964). This is less an act of benevolence and more an adherence to 
the unwritten laws of an enforced system of obligation (Cook and Emerson, 1978). Such 
effective systems of governance are rarely resented since they form a silent background to all 
social conduct and are widely understood. Specific rules or social structure (Portes, 1998) 
created in this arrangement form a type of governance bubble in which the uncertain, open, 
and incomplete arrangements (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) can be safely housed. 
Transgression of these rules, or norms of behavior, may invite nonmaterial, or social 
sanctions, such as the loss of legitimacy in the relationship (Nooteboom, 2007). The efficacy 
of this sanction as a governance mechanism is therefore higher in this collaborative context 
than it might be in a commodity-based or one-off spot market transaction. The pressure of 
these norms facilitates informality, permitting exchange with the absence of formal contracts 
(Lee, 2009).  
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The relationship atmosphere inside this bubble must go further than simple forbearance if 
collaborative and synergistic outcomes are to be realized. Additional efforts may include 
acting in the partner’s interest even when not obligated to do so (Luo, 2002). Extant literature 
suggests that such conditions of ‘noneconomic satisfaction’ may be both fulfilling and 
gratifying for partner firms (Geyskens et al., 2006) and can also facilitate conflict resolution 
(Medlin et al., 2005). This represents a fundamental difference from a transaction costs 
scenario based on self-interest seeking and cost monitoring behaviors (Williamson, 1983), 
toward one in which goodwill is generated and costs associated with monitoring partner 
behavior cease to represent a major factor. 
These descriptions of heightened collaboration and the near absence of malfeasance begin 
to sound utopian. The collaboration agenda may be abandoned in quick measure, however, if 
either party’s agenda ceases to be served well. Exit barriers are low with a preponderance of 
non-equity arrangements and less detailed contractual obligations and lower levels of material 
sanctions to malfeasance. Similarly, transgression of the social norms of obligation will evoke 
suspicion and may damage affective trust among partners, causing the reciprocal process to 
unravel (Silkoset, 2013). 
Successful exchange is characterized as a process comprising incremental exchange 
episodes rather than a single discrete transaction. Flexibility exists in the agendas of 
interacting partners and allows adaptation in reciprocal arrangements. Risk is mitigated 
through the inherent flexibility in expected outcomes and the relatively low level of 
consequence attached to each incremental exchange episode (Toon et al., 2012). Additionally 
the ongoing nature of the relationship is cognitively distinct from a discrete transaction and 
employs judgment and norm-based behaviors (Macintosh and Gentry, 1995). The motivation 
in this exchange process scenario is in achieving plural outcomes from the collective 
reciprocal exchanges.  
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Alliance performance satisfaction captures the extent to which expected outcomes were 
achieved and is defined here as satisfaction with the goals, standards and long term legacy of 
the project. While single item, or multi-item formative measures may be used to grade 
performance against ex ante agreed outcomes, for example ‘project was completed on time’, 
these measures overlook ex poste changes and so will miss elements of project performance 
that reflect valuable adaptations along the way. Goals, standards, and long term legacy better 
reflect satisfaction with the emergent collaborative project. 
Such measures of satisfaction are more resilient summative assessments of project 
performance (Lee et al. 2017). Exploratory and joint problem solving behaviors in these 
relationships carry a higher likelihood of interim failure where proposed solutions to 
individual adjustments may not bear fruit. Other outcomes from such trial and error activities 
such as increased relationism and greater experiential capital bring their own rewards and 
reflexive assessment across the dimensions of our concept of alliance performance 
satisfaction will reflect both the positive and negative outcomes of these efforts. This brings 
richer and more comprehensive conceptual insight. 
We consider that: 
H4a:  Technical exchange is positively related to alliance performance satisfaction. 
 
Managerial tenure is measured here as the number of years the focal managerial decision-
maker has worked for the firm. We consider that there is a characteristic difference in the way 
in which a manager interacts with their counterparts across high tenure and low tenure groups. 
While firm size may be associated with more formalized processes and standardized 
organizational behaviors, managerial tenure brings with it experience and greater 
understanding of behavioral norms associated with interpersonal conduct between firms (Lee 
2009). While longer serving managers will still exhibit collaborative behavior, adhering to 
unspecified obligations and social norms among counterparts, they bring with them a greater 
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intuitive sense of the boundaries of their benevolence. An experienced manager will better 
judge the balance of obligations—social, personal, and organizational—over time, and come 
more quickly to a decision on when to adapt to suit the counterpart and when to draw back. 
As a consequence, fewer superfluous exchange episodes occur. At the level of the individual 
project this may result in fewer, potentially fruitful, exploratory avenues of collaboration. The 
shift in emphasis towards calculative behavior may also detract from the exchange process. 
This can be reconciled by the manager as appropriate resource allocation behavior that brings 
efficient results most of the time. For the individual project such behavior among managers 
with longer tenure may be negative while representing an acceptable opportunity cost more 
generally. We reason that: 
H4b:  Managerial tenure has a negative impact on the link between technical exchange and 
alliance performance satisfaction, such that the positive relationship weakens as tenure 
increases. 
 
 
Methodology  
Sample and data collection 
The UK construction industry provided a suitable context for the investigation of the 
managerial relationship process and associated antecedent conditions. A spectrum of alliance 
arrangements exists within this industry from which a suitable configuration is selected. The 
traditional procurement route was selected for investigation in this study both because the 
nature of the relationship process reflects the context under investigation here and because of 
its ubiquitous employment across firm types and sizes, assisting in generalizability and 
maximizing value of the study for practitioners.  
The sample was taken from the membership list of the Royal Institute of British Architects 
(RIBA) using the systematic random sampling technique. RIBA is a professional association, 
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the membership list is comprehensive and contains the vast majority of qualified architects 
and architectural practices in the UK. Additionally, both the architect and the practice are 
included, which facilitated cross checking with company websites for an assessment of the 
reliability of the contact information. In order to test our assumptions on the reliability of the 
contact information, a random subsample of architects was selected from the sample and the 
practices were contacted by phone to confirm the contact information for the relevant 
architect was correct. 
Respondents were selected according to position within the practice, with senior architects 
chosen as most likely to be active project managers. Respondents were instructed to comment 
on a completed project for which they had acted as project manager. The project manager is 
the company representative who has clear working knowledge of the project at an operational 
level and interacts with the building contractor (Lui and Ngo, 2004). This precluded some 
junior staff and some senior directors who were responsible for business administration, but 
not individual project management. 
Scale Development and Pre-Test 
Multi-item, reflective measures were used for all constructs except the moderators, firm 
size and managerial tenure. The reliability of measures cannot be assumed to be replicated in 
new temporal contexts or population profiles and a process of measure development was 
undertaken within the pre-test phase. Content validity was assessed through consultation with 
a panel consisting of senior executives and academic experts in the field. Members of the 
panel completed the survey instrument in a mock distribution in which circumstances such as 
postal delivery, method of address, and accompanying instructions were the same as those 
planned for in the full-survey administration. Next, panel members were interviewed and the 
degree to which the measures captured the construct domain assessed. Findings from these 
interviews were incorporated in a final modification of the survey instrument. 
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Our technical exchange items were taken from Sarkar et al. (2001) and the relational 
capital ones from Kale et al. (2000). Compatibility items were taken from Sarkar et al. 
(2001), while similarity was modified from Murray and Kotabe (2005). To measure firm size, 
we used financial turnover of the architectural firm. Managerial tenure was measured as the 
number of years a manager had worked in the firm. Conceptually, we identify characteristic 
differences in small and large architectural practices and this facilitated a split in the group. 
The smaller architectural firms had a lower number of qualified architects, typically one, and 
little in the way of additional related firm competencies. Similarly, we anticipate 
characteristic behavioral differences among managers with longer and shorter tenure. 
 
Survey Administration 
The survey administration involved twelve hundred surveys sent out in one wave and 
followed a process similar to that outlined in Dillman et al’s (2014) Tailored Design Method. 
Common to this method, a pre-notification letter, survey pack, first reminder, and final 
reminder with a replacement survey pack, were distributed to the sample. Elementary 
measures adopted to avoid low response included the use of the full name and title of the 
respondent at each firm. Incentives were included to assist in limiting response attenuation. A 
summary of the study findings was sent to those respondents who elected to provide their 
contact details with the returned survey.  
Of the surveys sent out a total of 257 were returned and of these 200 were deemed usable. 
This response rate of 16% was considered satisfactory. Additional steps were taken to 
increase the robustness of our approach and provide greater confidence in the approach. A 
post hoc check was employed to ensure the competency of respondents. Respondents were 
asked to rate their knowledge of the project, degree of involvement, and confidence in 
answering the survey questions. A seven point, Likert scale was used (1 = “strongly disagree” 
and 7 = “strongly agree”). We dropped 5 respondents scoring 4.0 or below on one or more of 
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these statements. As a result, the mean rating across these measures was 6.59 and the final 
useable number of surveys was 195. 
Thus we employed a two-step approach to establishing respondent competence: a general 
measure of organizational position, and direct reporting of respondent competence through 
survey items (Slater and Atuahene-Gima, 2004).  
In order to address common method bias and because we acknowledge that common 
method bias can be a problem with self-report measures, we included several measures that 
did not tap behavioral concepts. These included duration of project and experience of 
architect. We also included reverse coded items at points throughout the survey.  
 
Analysis and Findings 
We test for the possible effects of non-response bias using the Armstrong and Overton 
(1977) technique which is represented in pertinent antecedent empirical studies (Fryxell et al., 
2002; White and Lui, 2005). We analyzed our sample comparing late and non-responders, 
based on our RIBA-provided understanding of characteristics (i.e., firm size) of firms in the 
population. A t-test revealed no significant differences between the two groups. The data was 
analyzed for normality to ensure that it met the assumptions for maximum likelihood analysis. 
The data did not carry any problems of normality. 
We adopt the established two-step approach to analysis of the model. We first tested the 
confirmatory model to assess the fit of our data to the conceptual model. Second, we assessed 
the fit of the hypothesized paths in the structural model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1998). The 
measurement model was analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS 23 software, 
based on maximum likelihood estimation. We assessed for reliability using construct 
reliability and Cronbach’s coefficient alpha with both measures giving values above .70 for 
our multi-item scales (Nunnally, 1978). Convergent validity is demonstrated through 
confirmatory factor loadings > .50 for each item on its respective construct with the lowest 
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loading at 0.57, and average variance extracted values for each construct above .50 (Fornell 
and Larcker, 1981). The confirmatory factor analysis showed that the proposed factor model 
had an acceptable fit to the data (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al 2006; Slater and Atuahene-Gima, 
2004): c2 (224) = 409.660, p=0.000, CFI=0.94, NNFI=0.94, RMSEA=0.07.  
We established discriminant validity through the Chi square difference test. Testing each 
pair of constructs in turn, two models were estimated: an unconstrained two-factor model and 
a second model with the path constrained to one. The resulting model fit statistics reveal 
better results for the unconstrained model (p < .05) for each model (Hair et al., 2006). Further, 
we assessed discriminant validity using the Fornell and Larcker (1981) approach comparing 
the average variance extracted (AVE) with the squared standardized coefficients. The results 
show that the AVE scores are greater than their respective squared standardized correlations 
demonstrating discriminant validity. Table 1 shows the Cronbach alphas, means, standard 
deviations and construct reliability/AVE scores.  
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
To test for common method variance (CMV) we used the Harman Single Factor test.  A 
total of 16 factors were identified and the first factor accounted for 31% of the variance 
satisfying the criteria for establishing an absence of method bias (Chang et al., 2010; Slater 
and Atuahene-Gima, 2004). While established and well known, (Malhotra et al., 2006), the 
Harman Single Factor test is not without limitations. In particular it is sensitivity to small 
CMV effects (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We employ a further check of CMV to check our single 
methid design. Using the Lindell and Whitney (2001) marker-variable technique we set 
contractual formality as our theoretically unrelated construct. This is a multi-item scale taken 
from Wuyts and Geyskens (2005).  The resulting CMV-adjusted correlations show no change 
in significance indicating an absence of CMV effects.  
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The structural model results indicate a satisfactory fit to the data: c2(231) = 556.484, 
p=0.000, CFI=0.90, NNFI=0.90, RMSEA=0.09. A control variable was added to the model to 
test for robustness; using prior relationship we checked for its influence on alliance 
performance satisfaction. The resulting estimate was non-significant, hence, indicating the 
absence of this theoretically credible alternative explanation. 
H1a suggests a positive relationship between compatibility and relational capital, and our 
findings support this path (β = 0.71, p <0.01). To test the moderating effect of firm size on 
this path between compatibility and relational capital we employed a spit group analysis. We 
used a median split for turnover and ran a two-group analysis to test for significance between 
the two models. The low turnover group gave a path coefficient of .73, p <0.01, while the 
high turnover group gave a path coefficient of .53, p <0,01. The chi square difference between 
these two groups was significant at 6.965 Thus, this moderator effect and H1b are supported. 
H2 proposes a positive relationship between similarity and relational capital. The path 
coefficient is low (0.08) and non-significant (at p =.05). Hence, this hypothesis is not 
supported. H3 proposes that relational capital has a positive relationship with technical 
exchange. This hypothesis is supported (β = 0.58, p <0.01).  
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
H4a suggests a positive association between technical exchange and alliance performance 
satisfaction. The analysis supports this hypothesis with an estimate of β = 0.58, significant at 
p <0.01. H4b extends insight into this relationship by testing for the moderating effects of 
managerial tenure. Using a split group analysis (median split), we ran a split group analysis of 
the data and tested for the difference between the groups. The Chi square difference is 29.748 
and significant. We therefore find a negative moderating effect of managerial tenure on the 
relationship between technical exchange and performance satisfaction as per the hypothesis.  
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This study addresses a gap in the literature by empirically testing the managerial relationship 
process and revealing the workings inside the black box of exchange. We conceptualize the 
managerial relationship process and describe the contextual drivers facilitating this. We 
further identify the moderating effects of firm size and managerial tenure. The dynamics of 
the managerial relationship process are central to the process of collaborative exchange 
(Eggert et al 2006). Efficacy in this zone of interorganizational interaction facilitates both the 
exchange of non-strategic resources but also those strategic resources that are a component of 
competitive value creation (Kotabe et al 2003). Sharing of strategic assets is not without risk 
and so exchange at this higher level is facilitated by the presence of relationship capital. 
Relational capital brings trust and more calculable levels of risk and relies on social exchange 
principles (Nooteboom 2007). Normative behaviors are established within the managerial 
relationship process and govern day to day actions (Kohtamaki  et al 2012). This governance 
form is distinct from contractual governance and functions separately. Importantly, these 
normative behaviors stretch across social exchange theory explanations to include a 
multiplicity of rules, or norms of behavior. These include Blau’s (1964) personal obligations 
such as gratitude and trust that form the essence of our relational capital concept and combine 
with rules of reciprocity in the exchange of higher level technical knowledge. Such aspects of 
the managerial relationship process give a clearer social exchange account of what is taking 
place and also set it apart from explanations transactional encounters more common in the 
TCA literature. 
 The focus on higher-level exchange requires greater intensity in the relationship and 
relational capital facilitates this, bringing greater certainty about normative behaviors and the 
ability of partner firms to rely upon these. Negative signaling effects of the contingent claims 
contract are pushed to the background as actors become cognizant of an atmosphere 
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characterized by collaborative rather than competitive agendas and they adopt an attitudinal 
position in which they are willing to be vulnerable (Lui and Ngo, 2004). The resulting shared 
behaviors allow access to all resources. This is the reaching into the pot of resources 
described earlier.  
 Within our study we model relational capital having a positive relationship with 
technical exchange. We reason that mutual trust, respect, and friendship are facets of the 
individual relationship and that where these exist they generate higher levels of relational 
capital. This relational capital supports normative behavior of exchange and so drives 
volitional exchange behaviors in the project. We find support for this hypothesis 
demonstrating the configuration of the managerial relationship process and supporting the 
rationale outlined here. 
 Antecedent conditions for managerial exchange may at first glance seem numerous. In 
this study we concentrate on those conditions that predispose partner firms to enter 
collaborative arrangements governed by shared norms and expectations of forbearance. We 
identify compatibility as a much-cited concept in the literature and define it here in closer 
terms. Compatibility, we argue, is the congruence of organizational cultures and technical 
competencies among partner firms. It follows that where compatibility is high, relational 
capital will follow. We test this hypothesis (H1a) and find that compatibility does have a 
positive effect on relational capital. We observe characteristic differences among firms in our 
study. In particular, smaller firms have few resources both in magnitude and scope. Larger 
firms for example are more likely to have additional technical competencies in house. These 
might include quantity surveyors and specialists in certain types of construction. Smaller 
firms are more reliant on partner firms to supply such technical competencies and so we 
reason that compatibility may be higher among smaller firms. Similarly, larger firms are more 
likely to be systems led and present a standardized offering to partnering firms. This is less 
evident in smaller firms and so the second part of compatibility, cultural congruence among 
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partner firms will be less evident for larger firms. Collectively we reason that firm size will 
negatively moderate the path between compatibility and relational capital. This means that 
compatibility will drive relational capital to a lesser extent in larger firms when compared to 
smaller firms. Our two groups analysis supports this hypothesis (H1b) and reveals a finer 
level of detail in the antecedent conditions for managerial exchange among collaborative 
firms. 
 Similarity among partner firms in respect of their resource profile is a second 
antecedent condition that we include in our conceptualization of drivers of the managerial 
exchange process. We reason that differences among the weight of resources that each firm 
brings will predispose one to have power over another. While this logic is more akin to 
transaction costs logic than social exchange theory we considered that this dynamic would 
manifest at a low level, facilitating coercion in regular decision making scenarios rather than 
full exploitation. This muted opportunism would, we reason, have a deleterious effect on 
goodwill and so on relational capital. We therefore proposed that similarity would lead to 
relational capital (H2). Yet, our results unveiled no relationship between similarity and 
relational capital. Prima facie, the coercive behavior we anticipated among dissimilar firms is 
not present in our data. Among the possible explanations, we favor two. First, the presence of 
a contingent claims contract in the background of the exchange was sufficient to remove all 
attempts at malfeasance. Second, the collaborative atmosphere in which firms find themselves 
carries effective normative governance that prevents this behavior. Social sanctions alone will 
act to dissuade self-interest seeking. Of these two possible explanations, we find the second 
one to be better aligned with the logic of our study and also the more convincing explanation. 
This said, further empirical work is needed to examine the underlying factors here.  
 Alliance performance satisfaction is our outcome measure of success in the 
managerial exchange process. We conceptualize this form of satisfaction over summative and 
discrete measures of performance for two reasons. First, satisfaction captures the general 
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feeling towards the process rather than the specific outcome. Second, the collaborative 
relationships we have chosen facilitate solutions during the process rather than set them out in 
detail ex ante. Where the technical exchange process is successful, partner firms will observe 
satisfactory outcomes. We therefore propose that technical exchange will have a positive 
impact on alliance performance satisfaction (H4a) and our analysis supports this hypothesized 
path.  
 Within our sample we observe some differences among managers according to their 
tenure. Those managers who are at an early point in their career may carry a lower stock of 
experience. They may also be keen to pursue opportunities wherever they arise. Collectively 
these factors predispose the manager with lower tenure towards more readily collaborating. 
Managers equipped with greater levels of tenure may reflect associated greater stocks of 
experience. Such experience may incline such managers to take a more systematic approach 
to their collaborative efforts based on a combination of what has worked well in the past, and 
what has not. The more discerning, long-tenure manager is also better placed to identify 
fruitless collaboration and may be inclined to withdraw efforts relating to technical exchange 
in a more timely manner than their less experienced counterparts. Consequently, we reason 
that managerial tenure has a negative moderating effect on the propensity of technical 
exchange to drive alliance performance satisfaction. Our analysis bears this out and we find 
support for our moderating effect (H4b). 
 Much extant work carries assumptions about interorganizational interactions that may 
not reflect the reality. Specifically, a dominant legacy of transaction costs thinking in 
management leads many academics to view such interactions as transactional in nature 
Robson et al 2008). Where value solutions are sought that require comparable input from both 
companies, as is the case in most alliances, these assumptions lack explanatory insight and 
may impede understanding. In this study we have taken a social exchange perspective to 
explain the managerial exchange process. We have tested our conceptual model of behaviors 
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and provided empirical support for the explanations that we give. The role of similarity is the 
only exception to this and here we identify possible causes for this unexpected outcome 
together with suggestions for further investigation. 
Limitations and Recommendations 
Limitations 
The study carries several notable limitations. The responses are single respondent which 
offers the potential for common method bias. While not an ideal design our context 
compensates somewhat by giving us good insight into firm behaviors. We also test 
thoroughly for the potential effects of common method bias and find that it is not evident. The 
study was comprehensive within the industrial sector and draws on a comprehensive list of 
the population from which random sampling was possible. However within the industry we 
note other procurement practices that are not considered by this study. We therefore limit 
generalizability to this sector, and to the (substantial) subsection of this sector that employs 
the traditional procurement route in construction projects. 
 
Recommendations 
Theoretical 
Process perspectives on interorganizational interactions is an under researched area in the 
alliance literature. While the alliance field is mature, transactional perspectives hold. This 
study seeks to shine a light into this conceptual blind spot. Further research is needed to better 
articulate measurement of exchange processes. Methodologically we typically take a snapshot 
in time and reflect this as a longitudinal story. Longitudinal perspectives and dynamic data are 
needed to better understand how the series of iterative exchange episode articulated in this 
work and common to collaborative exchange emerge. Until these methodological challenges 
are addressed, research in this area is likely to be underpowered. 
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Similar effects to those noted among smaller firms and managers with lower levels of tenure 
may be observed in larger firms with innovation sections. The firms in our study did not 
include this type and so these effects were not tested here. Replicating the managerial 
exchange process mapped out here, within very large organizations may offer insight into 
managerial processes in innovation. 
Managerial 
Managers are better informed about the nature of normative behavior as a governance 
mechanism as a result of this study. Assumptions surrounding the use of the contingent claims 
contract to ensure adherence to collaborative agendas are dispelled in this study. Instead a 
clearer picture of the specific outcomes of relational behaviors, specifically higher level 
technical exchange, are demonstrated. Joint aims and problem solving activities facilitate an 
atmosphere of trust and low, more calculable risk. The cost efficiencies of not monitoring are 
self-evident and indeed should be avoided to limit negative signalling effects.  
Compatible cultures and technical capabilities are found to be key ingredients for the function 
of a successful managerial process. Small firm approaches including flexibility and low 
resource scope also facilitate effective managerial exchange. While inherent in the small firm, 
such characteristics may also be replicated in sections within larger firms or in isolated 
projects and so the findings of this study could be applied in these contexts. Finally, 
managerial tenure has a deleterious impact on the relationship between technical exchange 
and alliance performance satisfaction. This reveals different behaviors among managers 
according to tenure and so, to experience. Managers with lower tenure may have a series of 
motivations for driving exchange including greater early career motivation and less refined 
perception of poor cost benefit in pursuing a project. Never the less this may be of benefit to 
the manager in generating valuable experience and to the firm in seeing less likely projects 
pushed through to completion. In the case of managers with longer tenure, projects carrying 
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risk may be exited from at an earlier point offering a better risk management profile for the 
firm. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
Measures Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Mean S.D.    1   2   3  4  5                      6 7 8 
1  Similarity .70 3.8 1.5 .92/.80        
2  Compatibility .90 4.7 1.3 0.01 .98/.89       
3  Relational Capital .91 4.7 1.4 0.11 0.81** .98/.92      
4  Technical Exchange .84 4.6 4.7 0.02 0.52** 0.51** .97/.88     
5  Alliance Performance 
Satisfaction 
 
6  Firm Size 
 
7  Managerial Tenure 
 
8 Prior Relationship 
 .93   
 
 
 n/a 
 
 n/a 
 
 n/a 
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  9.95 x 105 
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** p<0.01 
Notes: CR/average variance extracted shown on diagonal 
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Table 2. Structural Model Results and Split Group Moderator Results 
 
H Path Standardized estimate t-value 
H1a(+) Compatibility ® Relational Capital 0.71**     9.008** 
H2 (+) Similarity ® Relational Capital                0.08     1.194 
H3 (+) Relational Capital ® Technical Exchange 0.58**     7.343** 
H4a(+) Technical Exchange ® Alliance Performance Satisfaction 0.58**     7.315** 
 
Fit indices: c2(231)=556.484, p=0.000, CFI=0.90, NNFI=0.90, RMSEA=0.09 
   
H1b(-) Firm size among alliance partners has a negative impact on the relationship 
between compatibility and relational capital 
Split group moderator tests 
 
 Low Turnover group  
 Compatibility ® Relational Capital 0.73  4.289** 
 High Turnover group   
 Compatibility ® Relational Capital 0.53  7.534** 
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    Non-restricted model 
   c2(461)=781.921, p=0.000, CFI=0.89, NNFI=0.89, RMSEA=0.07 
  Restricted Model 
   c2(463)=788.886, p=0.000, CFI=0.89, NNFI=0.89, RMSEA=0.07 
Dc2=6.965** 
 
 
H4b(-)  managerial tenure has a negative impact on the relationship between technical exchange and 
alliance performance satisfaction 
 
 
Split group moderator tests 
Low tenure group 
Technical Exchange ® Alliance Performance Satisfaction 
High tenure group 
Technical Exchange ® Alliance Performance Satisfaction 
 
Non-restricted model 
   c2(461)=894.136, p=0.000, CFI=0.86, NNFI=0.86, RMSEA=0.07 
  Restricted Model 
   c2(463)=923.884, p=0.000, CFI=0.85, NNFI=0.85, RMSEA=0.07 
                         Dc2=29.748** 
** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.68                  5.874** 
0.42                  3.774** 
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Appendix A. Constructs and Scales 
 
Construct        Scales 
Compatibility • The organizational values and social norms prevalent in the two firms were congruent  
 • The goals and objectives of both firms were compatible with each other 
 • Technical capabilities of the two firms were compatible with each other 
• Employees of both firms had a comparable level of professional or trade skills 
• Resources brought to the project by each firm were very valuable for the other 
 
Firm Size 
 
• What is the approximate turnover of your firm (your office, not group) for all activities?       
 
 
Similarity 
 
• Overall, your firm and the building contractor had similar resource capabilities 
 • Overall, your firm and the building contractor had similar management capabilities  
 • Overall, your firm and the building contractor had dissimilar asset size 
  
 
Relational 
Capital  
 
• The relationship between you and your counterpart was characterised by a close, personal interaction  
• The relationship between you and your counterpart was characterised by mutual respect 
• The relationship between you and  your counterpart was characterised by mutual trust 
• The relationship between you and your counterpart was characterised by high reciprocity 
  
  
 
Technical 
 
• You had a close relationship with the engineers and technical staff of the building contractor 
exchange • In the development process, direction of communication was bilateral rather than unilateral 
 • Frequent contact between us and the building contractor’s engineers was important 
 • Through informal discussion, the building contractor often communicated important engineering information to us 
 
Managerial 
Tenure 
 
 
• How long have you worked for this firm?  
 
Alliance 
Performance 
Satisfaction 
 
• Both your firm and the building contractor overall, were satisfied with this project 
• Both your firm and the building contractor considered that the goals of this project were achieved 
• Both your firm and the building contractor considered that this project added to the long-term success of your firms 
• Both your firm and the building contractor are proud of the project 
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• Both your firm and the building contractor consider that overall the project was efficiently carried out 
• Both your firm and the building contractor consider that the venture was profitable for your firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
